This episode is about where morality actually comes from.
The question matters because of a claim that sits at the center of almost every argument for keeping religion embedded in public life: without religion, we have no morality. Strip away the church and the commandments, and all that remains is chaos. The argument is so pervasive it has become almost invisible, an assumption so widely shared that questioning it feels like questioning whether children need parents. It also happens to be precisely backwards.
I don’t say that from a safe distance. I was raised Catholic, and I know the pull of the Church’s certainty from the inside. Despite my agnosticism, I felt it again after each of my kids was born. The desire for certainty and community for my children led me back, much as it had led my parents. So I’m not describing a weakness I watched in other people.
Morality doesn’t require religion. If anything, morality has survived despite some of what organized religion has done in its name. I want to make that argument carefully, because it’s easy to make it carelessly, in ways that are unfair to religious people.
I’m not claiming religion has never produced moral goods. It has. The American abolition movement was substantially religiously motivated: Frederick Douglass, Harriet Tubman, the Quakers who ran the Underground Railroad. The civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s was organized largely through Black churches and led largely by ministers. The Catholic Worker movement, founded by Dorothy Day, built one of the most substantial networks of practical care for the poor in American history.
Those sit at the center of the history of moral progress, and they are genuinely religious.
What I’m claiming is more specific. The moral content of those movements (their commitment to human dignity, their opposition to domination, their insistence on the equal worth of every person) doesn’t come only through religion. The same commitments can be reached, and have been reached, by rigorous secular reasoning. The Enlightenment thinkers who built the philosophical foundations of human rights, Locke, Kant, Mill, and later Rawls, arrived at conclusions about human dignity you can’t tell apart in content from what the prophets insisted on. They took a different route and ended up in the same place.
And here’s a clue I want to pause on. The philosopher Derek Parfit, in his three-volume On What Matters, spent decades arguing that the major secular ethical theories, pursued honestly, all converge on the same conclusions about what we owe each other. When frameworks that start from completely different premises arrive at the same answer, the convergence itself is a form of evidence. You don’t need a revelation. The reasoning gets there on its own.
Now for the harder part. If morality evolved rather than being revealed, we have to ask where it actually came from.
Michael Tomasello has spent more than thirty years investigating the origins of human moral psychology. His work, synthesized in A Natural History of Human Morality, points to one capacity. Modern humans evolved, far beyond any other primate, in their capacity for shared intentionality: the ability to jointly attend to a common situation, share a goal, and coordinate toward it. That gave us a survival advantage no other species has matched.
And it produced something else: morality. Morality evolved, imperfectly and unevenly, as the set of rules that make possible the cooperation our species depends on. Nobody handed it down from above.
Chimpanzees share food. Apes protect their young. Our ancestors, long before they had a single word for any god, were already governing themselves by principles of mutual aid, because bands that internalized them survived better than bands that didn’t. There’s nothing pious about that story. It’s a practical one, and it’s older than every temple on earth.
The evolutionary account also explains why those intuitions fail in predictable ways. They were calibrated for in-groups of a few hundred people, and we now live in nations of hundreds of millions. They produce in-group favoritism and out-group hostility, which is exactly the raw material organized religion and nationalism have learned to exploit.
Jonathan Haidt’s work is useful here. Haidt identified six basic building blocks of human moral intuition: care, fairness, loyalty, authority, sanctity, and liberty. Progressives weight care and fairness heavily. Conservatives spread their weight more evenly across all six.
That explains why moral disagreement is so persistent. In some cases the people disagreeing aren’t disagreeing about the evidence at all. They’re weighting different foundations differently. It also explains why people resist clear evidence on a question like gender identity. People experience the claim that gender is a binary as a sacred proposition, not a factual one. Challenge it, and you don’t just seem wrong. You seem to be transgressing. Try to argue someone out of a sacred belief using only facts and logic, and you’re engaging the wrong circuitry.
I know that circuitry from the inside too. The messaging that greeted my family was clear. Gender is binary. Determined by God at conception. Fixed for life. Deviation is immoral. That answer was wrong, and I didn’t get there by deciding it was wrong, or by preferring an answer that was easier for my family. I got there by following the evidence, the same evidence my engineering training had taught me to follow, and once I did, it was impossible to ignore.
So if morality evolved rather than being revealed, the political claim built on the opposite assumption, that we need religion in our government to keep us moral, has to be tested against the record. What did religious institutions actually do with morality during the centuries when they held the most power? The next episode takes that record up in full. The short version is that governments that have embedded religious doctrine into law haven’t been more moral. They’ve been more certain, and certainty isn’t the same thing as goodness.
Morality before religion. Evidence before revelation. Democracy before theocracy. That’s what the evidence shows.
Phil Zuckerman, a sociologist who has studied the relationship between religion and social outcomes, finds that the most secular societies in the world, Scandinavia, Japan, Iceland, consistently rank among the highest on measures of social well-being, equality, justice, and human rights. They also rank among the lowest in rates of violent crime, corruption, and child poverty. If the story that you need religion to be moral were true, these countries would be a mess. They aren’t.
Martin Luther King Jr. understood the distinction precisely. What he called the social gospel wasn’t an appeal to Biblical authority as such. It insisted that faith, lived honestly, points toward the same evolved moral truths a clear examination of human dignity requires. That every person counts. That suffering matters. That the powerful don’t have the right to oppress the powerless simply because they’re powerful.
He didn’t start from Scripture, derive his commitments, and then apply them to civil rights. He recognized that Scripture, read honestly, condemns the same things evolved moral intuition condemns: the cruelty of arbitrary power, the dehumanization of people who don’t fit the dominant category. The social gospel is fiercely opposed today, just as it was in King’s time, precisely because it points to the same conclusion the evidence points to. Every human being’s dignity is non-negotiable.
I’ve been told more than once, by clergy, by politicians, by neighbors, that as a person of no religion my moral standing in this debate is limited. That because I don’t believe in God, I can’t speak to the values at stake. I reject that completely. The argument assumes exactly what needs to be demonstrated: that God has a design, that the design is knowable, and that the people claiming to know it are reading it correctly. None of that can be established by evidence. It’s a matter of faith, and it can’t be the basis for laws that govern people who don’t share the faith.
Here’s what I’m asking of religious people, and I’m not asking them to abandon their faith. The philosopher John Rawls called it public reason. In a democracy, the arguments used to justify the coercive power of the state have to be accessible to all citizens, and that includes the citizens who don’t share a particular religious tradition. Religious arguments can stay in public life. They have to be translatable, stated in terms a citizen who doesn’t share the faith can evaluate on the merits. The evidence about what transgender children need is translatable in exactly that way. You don’t need any religious commitment to evaluate it.
The First Amendment is an anti-theocratic document, which is a different thing from an anti-religious one. Thomas Jefferson, in his Statute for Religious Freedom in Virginia, wrote that “our civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions, any more than our opinions in physics or geometry.” The argument that people of no religion have no standing in debates about governance isn’t really theology. It’s politics, an argument about who gets to participate in democracy. And the Constitution’s answer is unambiguous. All citizens have equal standing, regardless of their theological convictions or lack thereof.
One more piece belongs on the table, because it explains how otherwise decent people end up on the wrong side of this. The psychologist Albert Bandura spent decades studying what he called moral disengagement, the mental maneuvers by which good people neutralize their own moral responses to harm they’re causing. Euphemistic labeling: we’re restricting access, not denying care. Displacement of responsibility: I’m just following the rules. Dehumanization: they’re confused children being manipulated by adults.
Every one of those maneuvers is visible in the current campaign against transgender children. The politicians voting for these bills mostly didn’t look carefully at the evidence and then disagree with it. They used one of Bandura’s maneuvers to avoid engaging with the evidence at all.
The antidote to moral disengagement is moral re-engagement: the simple, restored perception that a real human being is being affected. That’s why testimony matters. That’s why the stories of the people on the receiving end matter. There’s a word for the willingness to extend moral concern to people who aren’t in your group, who don’t share your certainty. The word is empathy. People treat empathy as a soft virtue. It’s actually the hardest and most politically consequential thing I know how to ask of anyone, because it requires you to sit with the discomfort of someone else’s reality without resolving it into a reassuring certainty. There’s nothing specifically liberal about that. It’s the logical extension of the moral instincts evolution gave us, applied honestly.
So when someone tells you that without their doctrine there is no morality, you have the evidence to answer. Morality is older than every temple. It was built by people who had to live together, and it’s still being built the same way, by the honest extension of concern to people who aren’t in your group. It doesn’t need anyone’s permission, and it doesn’t need a revelation. It needs the willingness to look.
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